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STAT£ or NEW YORK

SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ULSTER

In the Matter of tbe Application of
MELVlN GASS', 07-R-4 182

DECISION AND ORDER

Petitioner,

!ndexNo. 12-3199
RJTNo. 55-12-01873

For n Judgment Pursunnt to Article 78
of 1he Civil Practice Law and Rules
-against-

THE NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
(Supreme Court, Ulster County, Special Term)

APPEARA.\JCES:
Melvin Gass, 07·R~4 ! 82
Wallkill Correctional Facility
50 McKendrick Road

P. 0. Box G
\Vallkitl, New York 12589
Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General of New York Sm1e
Attorney for Respondent
(Laurn A. Sprague, Assistant Anorney General,
of Counsel)
Department of Law
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

Connolly, J.:
This is an Art icle 78 proceeding brought by petitioner challenging respondent's November
9, 2011 denial of parole release. Petitioner plead guilty to the following crimes; (i) Anempted
Murder in the Second Degree, (ii) Assault in the First Degree; (iii) Assault in the Second Degree, (iv)
Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, (v) Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the
Third Degree, (vi) Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, (vii) Criminal Contempt in the first
Degree, (viii) Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, and (ix) Endangering the Welfare of a

Child. The sentences upon S\lch convictions arc 10 run concurrently with the lengthiest sentence
consisting of a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 12 years. The convictions arose from an incident

involving petitioner shooting the victim four limes striking her in her right shoulder, left shoulder,
upper neck and behind her ear. Petitioner asserted that he was upset because the victim, the mother
of his daughter, hnd 1101 let him see his dnughter. The victim had a valid Order of Protection against
petitioner at the time of the incident. Pclitioner subsequently fled to Indiana where he remained for
10 years untiJ he was arrested in 2006.
In its decision denying Petitioner parole release, the Board stated:

24 months, denied. Next appearance 11 /2013.
Parole denied. After n personal interview, record review, and deliberation, this pnnel finds
your release is incompttrible with the public safety and welfare.
Your instanl offenses involved your attempted murder of a known female by shooting
her multiple times, despite the prior iss\lance of an order of protection.
Consideration has been given to your receipt of an earned eligibility certificate,
good behavior and programming, however, due to your course of conduct, that includes,
carry ing and ultimately using a handgun, your release nt this time is denied. There is a
rensonable probability you would not live and remain at liberty without violat·ing the law.
Petitioner's administrative appeal was received by the Appeals Unit on January g, 2012. The
Appeals Unit affirmed the Board ofParole's decision, mailing such decision to petitioner's attorney
on August 6, 2012, though it did not file a determination within four months of receipt of petitioner's
appeal. This a11icle 78 proceeding was filed September 11, 2012.
Pet it ioner advances che fol Iowing arguments in this proceeding, incorporating the arguments
made in his appeal': I) tbat the Board of Parole ("Boarcl") did not consider the requireci statutory
foctors; 2) that the Bonrd based its decision solely on the petitioner's instant offense and his criminal

'The Appeal was provided to the Court by respondent.
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record; 3) that the Board commissioners were not foir and impartial; 4) that the Board's decision did
not provide adequate detail; 5) that the Board did not consider the imprisonment guidelines; 6)
thnl the Board did not consider the petitioner's institutional achievements; 7) that the
Board did not give adequate consideration to petitioner's earned eligibility certificate; 8) that the
hold of 24 months constituted a resentencing; 9) that the Board's decision denied petitioner due
process of law and his right to Equal Protection; and 10) the Board did not properly consider and
apply the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law to his parole hearing.
The Board's actions are jutlicial in nature and may not be rev iewed if done in accordance
with the law (sae Exec\ltive Law §259-i(5] see also Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d 904,
905 [3rd Dept. , 2005]). Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) provides that discretionary release to parole
supervision is not to be granted to an irunate merely as a reward for good behavior while in prison,
but after considering whether "there is~ reasonable probability that, if such an inmate is released,
he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not ineompntible
with ihe welfare of society aud will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine
respect for law" (lvfatter ofKing v. New York State Division of Parole, 83 NY2cl 788, 790 fl 994),
affg 190 AD2d 423 [1 51 Dept., 1993]). Decisions regarding release on parole are discretionary and

will not be disl11rbed if they satisfy the stututory requirements (Executive Law§ 259-i; Matter of
Walker v. New York Stale Div. of Parola, 203 AD2d 757 [3'd Dept., 1994]) and there is no showing
of "irrationality bordering on impropriety" (M~mar of Russo v. New York Swte Bd. of Parole, 50
NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; Maner a/Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000}; Mauer ofSaunders v.

Travis, 238 AD2d 688 (3'd Dept., l 997]; Mauer of Felder v. Tl'avis, 278 AD2d 570 [3'd Dept.,

2000]).
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Initially, respondent asserts that certain of petitioner's arguments were WHived as they were
not raised in his administrative appeal, namely: l) that the Board was not foir and impartial, 2) the
Board did not properly consider and apply the 201 l amendments to the Executive Law to his parole
hearing, and 3) that the Board violated petitioner's right to Equal Protection. Such new
arguments are not preserved for review as lhey were not raised in petitioner's administrative appeal
(~·ee

lvfa(fer of Cn1z v Travis, 273 AD2d

M.fi,,649J2Q.Q.0J)., The Court notes, however, that even

considering such assertions, as <liscussed below, such assertions are without merit.
Executive Law §259-c (4) was amended and requires the Board to
establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such
writt~n procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation
of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood ofsttccess ofsuch persons upon release,
nnd assist members of the state board of parole in determining which in.mates may be
released to parole supervision.
In addition, Executive Law §259-i (2)(c) was amended to list all of lhe factors the Board is
reguired to consider in making parole release determinations in the same provision. Such
amendment did not add new factors for consideration but list all fncrors in the

sam~

paragraph.

As pelitioner was committed to the custody of the department in 2007, a transition
accountability plan ("TAP") has not been prepared for petitioner (see Corrections Law §71-a),
however, the record inclt1des a copy of the inmate status report. The record reflects that the Board
considered, inter alia, petitioner's institut ional records including his institutional achievements,
disciplinal)' record and release plans. The Board, in its Decision stated its consideration of
p<:titioner's earned eligibility certificate, good behavior and programming. During the interview, the
Board discussed the steps petitioner had taken toward rehabilitation including his receipt of a11
cu med eligibility certificate, his participation in air condition/refrigeration and builder/maintenance
progrums; his work as a reacher's aide ~md industries worker, discu~sed petitioner's plans to live with
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his parents and assist in taking care of hi:> sick mother, aclmowledgcd receipt of letters from
pe1 itioner's sister and a cousin, noted petitioner's Jack ofany Tier II's or l IJ's and noted that petjtioner

hnd fled the state after the incident and remnined in Indiana for ten years.
The record reflects that the Board, in its consideration of lhe statutory criteria set forth in
Executive Law §259-I (2)(c)(A)(i) through (viii), ascert!lined the steps petitioner had taken towards
his rehabilitation and the likelihood of his succe:;s if released to parole supervision. Accordingly,
pdi ti oner's contention that the Board did not properly consider and apply the 20 I 1 amendments to
Executive Law§ 259-c (4) is without meril.
Further, the Court rejects any claim that the Board violated Executive Law§ 259"1 (2)(c)(A)'s
requirements. The record demonstrntes that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, such
as petitioner's receipt ofan earned eligibility certificate, institutional programming and achievements,
discipl inary record, and release plans (see Executive La\\!§ 259-I; Maller of Marcus v. Alexander,
54 ADJd 476, 476-477 [3rd Dept., 2008); Maller ofG111kaiss v. New York State Div. of Parole, 50
A03d 1418, 1418-1419 (3rd Dept., 2008]). Though petitioner received an earned eligibility

certificate, the Parole Bonrd dctennined that lhere was a reasonable! probabHi ly that the petitioner
could not remain at liberty without violming the law. "(W)hile the relevant statutory factors must
be considered, it is well-settled that the weight to be accorded lo each of the factors lies solely within

the discrerion of the Parole Board. Moreover, the Board is not required to expressly discuss each of
the guidelines in its determination." (Matier ofPhillips v. Dennison, 41 AD3d l 7, 21 -22 (lst Dept.,
2007], Iv appl dismissed 9 NY3d 956 [2007], quoting Mauer of Walker v. Travis, 252 AD2d 360,

362 [ l st Dept., I998)). While petitioner's institutional record is to be considered, there is no
rt!quirement that the Board place an equnl or greater weight on petitioner's institutional record than
on the gravity of the instant offense, that is, shooting his child's mother four times while under an
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active order of protection, and a detennination thal such record is outweighed by the severity of the
instant offense is within the Board's discretion (see Anthony v. New York Stc1te Division of Parole,
17 AD3d 301 [lsl Dept., 2005]; Herben v. New York Stale Board of Parole, 97 AD2d 128 [!st

Dept, 1983 ]). Further, the Board's denial of parole does not constitute a re-sentencing (see Malfer
of Marsh v NYS Division of Parole, 31 AD3d 898 [3rd Dept., 2006)); Murray v Evans, 83 AD3d
1320[ 3rd Depl., 2011). Moreover, petitioner's due process argument is without merit. Petitioner has
no due process right to parole (see Maller ofRusso v. New York State Board ofParole, 50 NY2d 69

[I 988)). Further, under ow· senr~ncing S)_'.Stem the court initially sets a minimum and a maximum

period of incarceration, but the Board makes the ultimate deter~4i.ati on whether to r~ease an inmate

prior to his or her completion of the maxi~~l'E_!.~~~~~~ (Marter ofSilmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470,
476 [2000)).

Even considering petitioner's equal protection claim, such claim is without merit. Petitioner
a lieges that he was denied equal protection of the Jaw as the Board allegedly continued to use his

...

''p•ISt criminal history" ro deny his release. Jn analyzing an eq\lal protection claim, "[s]lricl scrutiny

is applied in only two in.stunccs, where the statutory or regulatory classification impinges on
limdamental rights or discriminates against a suspect class." (see Jimenez v. Coughlin, 117 A.D.2d
1,4 (3 rd Dept., 1986]). Petitioner has no fundamental right to be "prematurely released from
confinement" nor has he demonstrated that he was treated differently from others similarly situated.
Accordingly, the rational basis standard applies to petitioner's claim (Id.). The record reflects,

however, that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors, petitioner has not demonstrated
he was treated differently from any other inmate appearing before the Board and, additionally, the
Board provided u rationul basis for their denial of petitioner's release to parole supervision.
Accordingly, such claim is withoui merit.
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Additionally, even were the Court to consider petitioner's claim that he was denied a fair and
impartial hearing as he alleges his receipt of an Earned Eligibility Certificate was not properly
considered, as noted above, and ns acknowledged by petitioner, receipt of such certificate does not
preclude the Board from concluding that petitioner should not be released to parole supervision (see

Mafler of Cornejo v. New York Stare Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 713 [3d Dept., 2000]).
Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Petilioner has failed to meet his burden of prese11ting evidence demonstrating that the Board violated
any positive statutory requirement in determining not to release him. The record supports the
rationality of the Board's determination, and it certainly cannot be held that the determination is so
irrationol as to border on impropriety (Maller ofJ<usso v. New York State Board ofParole, 50 NY2d
69, 77 [1980]; Matter of Wright v. Parole Division, 132 AD2d 821, 822 [3rd Dept. , 1987)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to mecc his burden of proof in ttus proceeding.
The Court observes that certain records ofa confidential nature relating to the petitioner were

submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, is sealing nil records

su bmitted for in camera review.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, that lhe petition is hereby dismissed and the reliefrequested in this proceeding
is in all respects denied, and it is further
ORDERED, that the confidential records submitted to the Court for in came1·a review are
scaled.
This Memorandum constitutes the Decision and Order of the Cou1t. This original Decision
and Order ttnd confidential records are being returned to the attorney for the respondent. The below
referenced original papers are being mailed to the Ulster County Clerk. The signing of this
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Decision anti Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not

rellc'1ed from the provision of that rule rcg;1rding filing, entry or notice of entry the Ulster
County Clerk.

SO ORDERED.
ENTER.
Dntcd: February

L 20 I

J

Kingston, New York

Gerald W. Connolly
Acting Supreme Court Just
Papers Considered:
I.

Order to Show Cause dated October 12, 2012; Notice of Petition; Verified
Petition dated August 27, 20L2 with memomndum of law.

2.

Verified Answer dated December 11, 2012; Affirmation of Laura A. Sprague,
Esq. dated December 1 l, 2012 with accompanying exhibits.
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